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Abstract 
We present data from an international survey of scientists working at volcanic observatories 
concerning eruption likelihoods. The scientists were asked a range of questions using different 
types of phrasing. The data suggest that the phrasing of questions affects the ways in which 
probabilities are estimated. In total, 71% of respondents (N=70) exhibited some form of 
inconsistency in their answers between and/or within different question formats. The data also 
allow for an analysis of the use of scaling in probabilistic assessment, and the use of quantitative 
versus verbal risk measurements. However, some respondents were uncomfortable with 
providing any numerical probability estimate, perhaps suggesting that they considered the 
uncertainty too high for meaningful judgements to be made.  
Keywords: expert judgement; volcanic risk; probability 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Research in psychology on how individuals estimate probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1973,1974; Lichtenstein and Fischoff, 1980; Gigerenzer, 2008; Kynn, 2008) indicates that there 
are widespread issues in general populations with estimating probability that commonly results 
in inconsistencies, inaccuracies and biases. With the increasing use of expert judgement in 
forecasting of natural hazards and assessment of risk, this paper examines whether these issues 
are evident in groups of scientists1. We focus in particular on volcanologists who are working in 
volcano monitoring institutions and officially provide information for governments during 
volcanic crises. Training is very_m variable among volcanologists in statistics and probabilities. 
So although a technical group might be expected to have a better understanding of 
probabilities, there nonetheless may be deficiencies in education or other factors that lead to 
poor understanding of probabilities and similar problems to the wider population. Related to 
these issues is the matter of communicating probabilistic forecasts to a general public and 
decision-makers who do not necessarily have a technical background. Qualitative descriptors of 
probabilities, such as “very likely” or “unlikely” might be used to convey the forecast. Here a 
question arises as to whether numerical values of probability match qualitative descriptors 
consistently. In this paper, we survey 95 volcanologists, examining in particular responses 
relating to the probability of an eruption from the volcano that they were working on (specified 
                                                             
1 In this paper, “scientists” and “experts” refer to the volcanologists surveyed. The terms are used 
interchangeably. 
individually at the start of the survey). We examine the probability distributions that were 
produced, the ways in which different probabilities relate to one another, and some 
inconsistencies between the responses to some of the questions.  
2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Volcanic risk is highly uncertain. Many of the signals that are measureable at the surface are 
indicators that magma is moving, but do not guarantee that it will erupt. Forecasting volcanic 
eruptions is therefore challenging (e.g. Sparks, 2003; Cashman and Sparks, 2013) – but scientists 
are frequently asked for assessments because of the high stakes involved when a population is 
in danger. In many countries, volcano monitoring (where it is done at all) is the responsibility of 
particular agencies, often called “volcano observatories” (e.g. Donovan and Oppenheimer, 
2015). The day-to-day work of volcano observatories involves the collection and analysis of a 
range of datasets, usually focussed on measuring seismicity, ground deformation and volcanic 
gas emissions (e.g. Tilling, 2008). Staff at volcano observatories includes scientists and technical 
specialists, who may or may not have postgraduate qualifications. In referring to these scientists 
as “experts”, we take the view that formal qualification is not necessarily an indicator of 
expertise (e.g. Wynne, 1996). Volcano observatory scientists are therefore referred to as 
experts, because they study the activity of volcano on a daily basis and are the official source of 
information about the volcano to civil protection organisations and governments.  
 
The high levels of uncertainty associated with volcanic emergencies are well documented 
(Aspinall et al., 2003; Newhall and Hoblitt, 2002; Marzocchi et al., 2012; Marzocchi and Woo, 
2009; Sparks et al., 2013). The assessment of risk from volcanoes requires the compilation of 
multiple strands of evidence, datasets, models and methods (Aspinall et al., 2003). In order to 
make recommendations based on diverse forms of evidence, belief-based probabilistic methods 
such as expert elicitation and Bayesian methods (e.g. Aspinall et al., 2002; Aspinall, 2006; Hincks 
et al., 2014; Marzocchi et al., 2004, 2008; Neri et al., 2008; Donovan et al., 2012) are increasingly 
being advocated and applied. These methods have been effectively used on Montserrat over a 
long period (Aspinall et al., 2002; Donovan et al., 2012). Other forms of structured and 
unstructured probability estimation may also be used in an emergency. Yet questions remain 
about the ways in which experts perceive probabilities and respond to questions with different 
formulations (e.g. O’Hagan et al., 2006; Doyle et al., 2014).  This study explores volcanologists’ 
judgements of probabilities in an informal and theoretical context (as opposed to an operational 
setting), in order to assess the heuristics, role of framing and role of scaling in their responses. 
This section reviews some of the literature on probability judgements.  
2.1 Measures of judgment 
 Individuals vary in their ability to judge probabilities (e.g. O’Hagan et al., 2006; Tversky and 
Kahneman 1983; Kahneman and Tversky, 1982; Gigerenzer et al., 2005, 2007), possibly 
associated with reliance on heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), the interpretation of 
which may depend on views about the nature of probability itself (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 
1996; Gigerenzer, 1994; Vranas, 2000). In this section, we contextualise the following discussion 
in terms of how the accuracy of probability judgements may be measured, looking in turn at 
calibration, informativeness and reliability. Calibration is a measure of the relationship between 
a set of subjective probability judgements and the corresponding relative frequency of the 
events in question. It is affected by over/underconfidence, over-extremity and discrimination 
(see O’Hagan et al., 2006 for a detailed review). Overconfidence is defined as the view that an 
event is more likely than the relative frequency; over-extremity is the tendency to overestimate 
low probabilities and underestimate high probabilities; discrimination is the ability to 
discriminate between low and high probability events. There is some evidence that calibration 
of experts can be improved with training (e.g. with feedback; Ferrell, 1994; Fischoff, 1991). It 
may also be context-specific – there is evidence from some fields that the potential perceived 
impact of a particular event may affect judgements (e.g. see discussion in O’Hagan et al., 2006). 
In volcanology, calibration is difficult to determine empirically, because most of the events in 
which volcanologists are interested are single events without frequency data – such as the 
likelihood of an explosion on a particular volcano in the next six months. There are, however, 
other methods that can estimate calibration (e.g. Cooke 1991). 
 
 Calibration describes the accuracy of a judgement (whether or not it is correct); 
informativeness describes the precision of a judgement (how well resolved it is around the 
correct value). It refers to the uncertainty bounds on an expert’s response to a probability 
question, and therefore also reflects their confidence in their own estimate. Calibration and 
informativeness have been shown to be distinct from the level of disciplinary expertise that an 
individual may have: tests of knowledge do not correlate with calibration (e.g. Kahneman et al., 
1982), although in general experts may produce more convincing responses than lay people 
(e.g. Murphy et al., 1984). However, calibration is not the only issue involved in probability 
judgements. There are also broader questions about how experts interpret probability questions 
and probability theory: how consistent they are when different wordings are used, for example. 
We turn now to discuss the social psychology literature that seeks to explain the ways in which 
such judgements are made. 
 
2.2 Heuristics and biases 
Probability estimation by both experts and laypeople has been investigated within psychology 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1973, 1974; Lichtenstein and Fischoff, 1982; Kynn, 2008; Kahneman et 
al., 1982; Kahneman and Tversky 1972; Plous, 1989; Gigerenzer, 2008; Goldstein and Rathschild, 
2014; Slovic, 2000). These studies have suggested that the estimation of probabilities relates to 
a series of heuristics and biases. Heuristics are rules that are applied in the decision to place a 
particular probability on an event: they are difficult to quantify and have varying degrees of 
effect in different individuals. In probability estimation, they may include “rules of thumb” about 
the reliability of certain types of data or the relative importance of types of data. Understanding 
the variability in the use of heuristics provides insights into the cognitive processes involved in 
assigning probabilities, which is important in risk assessment and communication. 
 
We consider here three examples of heuristics that are relevant to the estimation of 
probabilities: base-rate neglect, anchoring and availability. Base-rate neglect occurs when 
individuals partly neglect base-rate frequencies, while relying on cues or informal decision rules 
(‘heuristics’), which may have dubious validity. The problem with base-rate neglect is that it is 
not meaningful to have two probabilities for the same event, one that is based solely on 
frequency and one that incorporates new information such as volcano monitoring data. For 
example, the probability of an eruption in the next year at a particular volcano is 0.2 based on 
historical frequency. If a seismic swarm occurs, however, we may consider that the probability 
of an eruption in the next year has increased above the base-rate. Gigerenzer (1991) has 
emphasised the distinction between single-event probabilities and frequencies as a subset of 
the belief-based–frequentist divide. He notes that “Probability theory is about frequencies, not 
about single events. To compare the two means comparing apples with oranges” (1991: 88). 
This comment sums up the need for belief-based methods: they allow the evaluation of the 
probability of individual events based on a wide range of evidence. The comparison of 
probabilities obtained from frequency analysis and those obtained from belief-based analysis is 
not conceptually meaningful (Dawid, 1982; Hacking, 2001) for a single event (though belief-
based analysis may take frequencies into account). The relationship between frequency-based 
and belief-based probabilities is not straightforward, and depends upon individual philosophies 
of probability: “strong frequentists” argue, with (Gigerenzer, 1991), that only frequencies are 
valid and that single-event probabilities are meaningless and vulnerable to heuristics such as 
base-rate neglect, while Bayesians argue that frequencies are limited in their usefulness for real-
world problems and decision-making under uncertainty. 
 
In addition to base-rate neglect, the availability bias occurs when subjects base their estimation 
on previous experience – something that is “available” to them in their memory (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1973). Anchoring occurs when individuals base their estimates on scaling up or 
down from a “set” value that they have decided upon, and may result in systematically imposed 
probability distributions based on scaling. The use of heuristics provides some explanation of 
the variability in belief-based probability estimates, and has been applied in a slightly different 
way to issues around expert judgement (MacGillivray 2014).  
 
There have been a number of studies dealing with potential differences in heuristics between 
“lay” and “expert” groups. Many of these studies suggest that experts are susceptible to the 
same heuristics and biases as laypeople: O’Hagan et al., 2006 state that “substantive expertise in 
a specialist area is no guarantee of normative expertise in providing coherent probability 
assessment” (p.58; see also for example reviews in Doyle et al., 2014; Smith and Kida, 1991; 
Burgman et al., 2011). A distinction may be drawn between expertise in a particular discipline 
(such as volcanology), and expertise in the provision of probability estimates (e.g. Doyle et al., 
2014; Cooke, 1991; Burgman et al, 2011; Martin et al., 2012). Since probability estimation is 
increasingly used to inform volcanic risk assessment, it is important to understand the variability 
of experts’ abilities to provide uncertain judgements, and any factors that affect that variability. 
 
2.3 Issues of framing in probability estimation 
There are several ways in which probability judgement may be affected by the wording of the 
question that is asked and how the question is therefore conceptually represented, known as 
“framing” (e.g. O’Hagan et al., 2006; Gigerenzer, 1991; Hoffage et al., 2000). 
Some studies have examined in particular the language that is used in framing probability 
estimates (e.g. Doyle et al., 2014; Brun and Teigen, 1988; Teigen and Brun, 1999, 2003; Risbey 
and Kandlikar, 2007; Doyle et al., 2011). Positive and negative framing, for example, may impact 
the response to probability questions (Teigen and Brun, 1999). Probability questions can also be 
phrased to help or hinder respondents in the avoidance of typical “traps” (Teigen and Brun, 
1999). 
 
In addition to issues of language, the framing of questions in terms of time is important in 
determining probability judgements. Questions can be expressed as a likelihood of an event in 
particular time period, or as the time period in which the event has a particular likelihood of 
occurring, for example. People may be shy of giving a probabilistic frequency estimate of “1 in 
1” (ie, with stating that an event will certainly occur), but be more content with estimating a 
number of days or years within which the event will occur. The use of different time periods that 
show some kind of scaling (in this paper, we use 3, 30 and 300 years) can also have an impact on 
the heuristics applied by individuals. Doyle et al (2011, 2014) explored some of the implications 
of time frames on estimates, and showed that estimates were biased over the longer time 
periods due to anchoring in the shorter periods.  
 
2.4 Verbal versus numerical risks 
There are two primary ways of providing forecasts – numerical and verbal. Verbal assessments 
may involve a verbal scale, such as “very high chance” to “very low chance” or even “no chance 
at all”. Individual judgements about the use of such scales have been shown to depend on their 
perception of the scale itself (Parducci, 1965; Eiser and White, 1974). Verbal scales cannot be 
related easily to numerical estimates, since the perception that something is a “high” risk may 
depend on subjective, social factors. People react to the wording of the scale (Eiser and 
Hoepfner, 1991) and to the perceived consequences of the risk being realised (Teigen and Brun, 
2003; Bruine de Bruin et al.2000; Karelitz and Budescu, 2004). The interpersonal variability in 
reactions to a verbal scale is a significant issue for risk communication, since the wording of risk 
assessments affects their impact on policymakers and the public.  
 
In this paper, we use different phrasings of questions with regard to time period to investigate 
the role of scaling and other heuristics in the estimation of probabilities of eruption.  
3. METHODS 
3.1 Survey design 
A survey of scientists working at volcano observatories was carried out in 2011. The use of a 
quantitative survey was judged the best method to obtain a statistically useful sample of 
scientists from a large number of volcanoes. While the size of the sample allows only explorative 
statistics, it provides valuable insights. Scientists were asked a range of questions about a 
volcano that they work on – which they specified early in the survey. In this paper, we report the 
results from the questions regarding the likelihood of eruptions at ‘their’ volcano within 
different time-frames, using different question formats.  Specifically, these response formats 
involved (a) likelihood ratings – “How likely is it that [volcano name] will have a major eruption 
within the next [N] years?”, with responses on a 7-point scale from ‘extremely unlikely (1) to 
‘extremely likely’ (7); (b) chance estimates – “Please express your estimate in terms of “1 chance 
in...” (E.g. “1 chance in 10”, “1 chance in 1000” – fill in ANY number you wish. If you are 
absolutely certain an eruption will occur, say, “1 chance in 1”)” ; these pairs of questions were 
repeated for N = 3, 30 and 300 years; and (c) timescale forecasts – “I believe that [volcano 
name] will certainly have a major eruption some time within.... years” and “I believe that there 
is at least a 50:50 chance that [volcano name] will have a major eruption within the 
next...years”, respondents being required to fill in the number of years (d) confidence – “How 
confident are you in the estimates you have given above (taken as a whole)?” (extremely 
unconfident (1) to extremely confident (7)). Additional responses from the survey are published 
elsewhere (Donovan et al., 2014). 
 
In addition to these questions, respondents were also asked for their age, nationality, gender, 
highest level of education and experience working in their current role. These variables were 
used as predictor variables in the statistical analyses in order to assess demographic factors that 
might affect the result. Unless stated, demographic variables had no significant effect on the 
responses. 
The questions are summarised in Table 1. 
  Question Response type 
S3 How likely is it that [volcano name] will have a major 
eruption within the next 3 years? 
Scale from ‘extremely unlikely 
(1) to ‘extremely likely’ (7) 
C3 Please express your estimate in terms of “1 chance 
in...” (E.g. “1 chance in 10”, “1 chance in 1000” – fill 
in ANY number you wish. If you are absolutely certain 
an eruption will occur, say, “1 chance in 1”) 
Chance estimate 
S30 How likely is it that [volcano name] will have a major 
eruption within the next 30 years? 
Scale from ‘extremely unlikely 
(1) to ‘extremely likely’ (7) 
C30 Please express your estimate in terms of “1 chance 
in...” (E.g. “1 chance in 10”, “1 chance in 1000” – fill 
in ANY number you wish. If you are absolutely certain 
an eruption will occur, say, “1 chance in 1”) 
Chance estimate 
S300 How likely is it that [volcano name] will have a major 
eruption within the next 300 years? 
Scale from ‘extremely unlikely 
(1) to ‘extremely likely’ (7) 
C300 Please express your estimate in terms of “1 chance 
in...” (E.g. “1 chance in 10”, “1 chance in 1000” – fill 
in ANY number you wish. If you are absolutely certain 
an eruption will occur, say, “1 chance in 1”) 
Chance estimate 
T1 I believe that [volcano name] will certainly have a 
major eruption some time within.... years 
Time estimate 
T50 I believe that there is at least a 50:50 chance that 
[volcano name] will have a major eruption within the 
next...years 
Time estimate 
Con How confident are you in the estimates you have 
given above (taken as a whole)? 
Scale from extremely 
unconfident (1) to extremely 
confident (7) 
Table 1. Questions applied in the survey. Note that scale variables only gave verbal descriptions 
for the two ends of the scale. The codes provided in the first column are used later to 
demonstrate how the derived scores were calculated. “S” variables are those referring to the 
verbal scale; “C” variables are chance estimates; “T” variables are referred to as timescale 
estimates 
3.2 Statistical methods 
Initially, several derived scores were calculated. Three sets of transformations were carried out 
on the chance estimates to assess the use of anchoring and test for any inconsistencies in 
experts’ answers: C30 was divided by C3; C300 was divided by C30; and C300 was also divided 
by C3.T50 was also divided by T1 variable for a similar reason (see Table 2). Dummy variables 
were then created to indicate whether or not scaling by an integer was used in calculating the 
answers.  The S variables (i.e. verbal scale estimates, see Table 1) were compared with the 
chance estimates (C values) to look at how the verbalscale was used in relation to probability 
estimates. Four other dummy variables were also calculated to look for anchoring effects and 
inconsistencies between different timescales and framings. These checked for (i) consistency 
between the 3 year and 30 year chance estimates (C3 and C30); (ii) consistency between the 30 
and 300 year chance estimates (C30 and C300); (iii) consistency between chance variables and 
“certainly within” (C values and T1); (iv) consistency between chance variables and 50:50 (C 
values and T50); (v) consistency between the two timescale values (T1 and T50). Finally, a 
variable representing “any inconsistency” was calculated (Con). Inconsistencies involved: 
 Higher probabilities for eruptions over shorter timescales than longer ones; 
 Longer timescales for a 50:50 chance of eruption than for certainty of an eruption; 
 Discrepancies between the chance distributions and the timescales, such as a 1 in 10 
probability of an eruption in the next 300 years, but certainty in an eruption in 200 
years.  
The calculated variables are summarised in Table 2.  
 
The variables were tested using a range of statistical methods. As the dataset failed tests for 
normality and homogeneity of variance, non-parametric tests were applied. To examine the 
relationship between scale variables, Spearman’s ρ was used. To assess the relationships 
between nominal and scale variables, the Kruskal-Wallis analysis of variance was used (H). This is 
a non-parametric test that ranks the median values within each category of the predictor. 
Similarly, for two-category variables, the Mann-Whitney test was used (U). Neither of these 
tests produced significant results. Finally, relationships between categorical variables were 
examined using Pearson’s χ2and the likelihood ratio. All tests were assessed at the 5% 
significance level.  
 
Dummy variable Calculation Meaning 
Check3-30 C30/C3 If >1, then the values are 
consistent (ie, an 
eruption in 3 years is less 
likely than in 30 years) 
Check30-300 C300/C30 If >1, then the values are 
consistent (ie, an 
eruption in 30 years is 
less likely than in 300 
years) 
Check3-300 C300/C3 If >1, then the values are 
consistent (ie, an 
eruption in 3 years is less 
likely than in 300 years) 
Checktime T50/T1 If <1, then the values are 
consistent (ie, the time 
period given for a 50-50 
chance of eruption is 
shorter than that for 
“certainly within”. 
Consist3_30 Coded based on Check3-30 0=inconsistent, 
1=consistent (ie value for 
30 years greater than or 
equal to 3 years) 
Consist30_300 Coded based on Check30-300 0=inconsistent, 
1=consistent (ie value for 
300 years greater than or 
equal to 30 years) 
Consist_CT1 Coded based on T1 and C3, 
C30, C300  
0=inconsistent, 
1=consistent (i.e., if 
T1<300 and C300>1, then 
answer is inconsistent;  
Consist_CT50 Coded based on T50 and C3, 
C30, C300;  
0=inconsistent, 
1=consistent (i.e. the 
probabilities given in for 
C3, C30 and C300 are 
consistent with the time 
period given for T50.) 
AnyInconsist If any of consistency variables 
=0, then 0; else 1.  
Is there any 
inconsistency for this 
respondent? 
Table 2. Calculations carried out on the variables in Table 1 to produce indicators of consistency 
in estimates. 
4 RESULTS 
4.1 Survey demographic 
The scientists who responded to the survey varied in their willingness to answer all of the 
questions – particularly those questions that required numerical responses. In total, 111 
scientists started the survey, but only 95 answered the questions considered in this paper. In the 
case of chance estimates only 74 responded out of the 95. Of these 74 respondents, 20 were 
women and 54 were men. In terms of tectonic setting, 12 worked on volcanoes associated with 
mantle plumes and 59 at volcanoes associated with subduction zones (3 failed to specify their 
volcano). In total, 45 had doctoral degrees and 16 had Masters degrees (volcano observatory 
scientists do not always have higher degrees). Fifty had lived in their current community for 
more than 10 years, and 44 lived within 120 km of the volcano in question. The distribution of 
ages was bimodal (with modes at ~30 and ~50), with a mean of 46. The distribution of the larger 
dataset was similar in structure with a mean at 44. Nine scientists out of the 95 had responded 
to the “half-half” and “certainly within” variables, but not the chance estimates.  
4.2 Verbal and numerical scales 
Of the 21 scientists unwilling to provide chance estimates, some stated that this was due to the 
high levels of uncertainty involved. Men were 3 times more likely to give quantitative estimates 
than women (based on the odds ratio; χ2 = 4.8, p<0.05), but no other demographic variables 
were significant. The following sections refer to the 74 scientists who provided responses to 
both timescale and chance ratings, with the exception of 4.5, which refers to the 83 who gave 
timeframe estimates.  
 
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the probability value given, and the use of the verbal 
scale. This demonstrates that over both short and long timescales, lower probabilities are more 
difficult to estimate and the relationship between the perception of a “low” probability and a 
“high” probability on a verbal scale varies between experts. This is consistent with the extensive 
psychological literature on probability estimates in both lay and expert subjects (e.g.Doyle et 
al.,2011, 2014; Teigen and Brun, 1999; Bruine de Bruin et al., 2000; Budescu and Karelitz, 2004). 


 Figure 1. Range of values (1 in N) given for each time period, plotted against the position on 
the verbal scale selected by the respondents. 
 
Use of the verbal scale in relation to chance estimates suggests (Figure 1) that there was 
considerable overlap between categories, particularly at the low probability end of the scale – 
where the overlap spans several orders of magnitude in the 3-year case (S3 and C3). However, 
over a 30-year timescale (S30 and C30), the overlap was more balanced with some overlap at 
the high-probability end of the scale. Finally, over the longest time period (S300 and C300), the 
variation was greatest at the low-probability end, but showed non-linear variation throughout. 
The majority of volcanoes were considered likely to erupt on a 300 year timescale (30 out of 70 
volcanoes were considered to have a 1 in 1 chance of erupting; 55 were rated 6 or 7 on the 
qualitative scale). 
4.3 Chance estimates 
We asked scientists to express their probabilities in the form “1 chance in N”. Using this 
notation, ten scientists provided a higher value for the probability of eruption in 3 years than in 
30 years (Check3-30), and 3 had provided a higher probability for an eruption in 300 years than 
in 30 years (Check30-300). The majority of scientists had successfully applied the notation, 
though as noted above 14 gave the same probability for all timescales, including 4 who gave 
unity for all timescales. There were no significant predictor variables. 
 
A comparison between inconsistencies within the numerical likelihoods and those using the 
verbal scale showed that half of the inconsistencies were also replicated in the verbal scale 
between 3 and 30 years (there were no inconsistencies using the verbal scale between 30 and 
300 years). This suggests that the chance notation itself was not the problem, but that 
estimating over specific time periods was. The respondents who made this error had also given 
high probabilities on both types of scale for 3 and 300 years, and then a much lower probability 
over 30 years. This result may imply that they assumed that the 30 year probability excluded the 
eruption they expect within 3 years – a question of phrasing. However, the verbal scale was in 
general used more consistently – and by all 95 respondents.  
4.4 Use of scaling  
The survey also allowed for analysis of the heuristics applied by scientists when scaling from a 
likelihood in 3 years (C3) to the other timescales. Scaling factors were calculated by dividing the 
longer timeframe values for “1 in N” with the shorter timeframes. The results suggest that 
almost four fifths of respondents used some form of scaling by an integer; 15 used a factor of 10 
between 3 and 30 years, and 8 had used a factor of 10 between 30 and 300 years.  Fourteen 
scientists gave the same probability for all timescales – six of these gave unity (i.e. certainty of 
an eruption). These data are summarised in Table 3. 
 
 3 to 30 years 30 to 300 years 
Linear scaling rule: factor of 2 10 13 
Linear scaling rule: factor of 5 5 9 
Linear scaling rule: factor of 10 14 9 
Linear scaling rule: factor of 100 1 4 
Other linear scaling rule 4 9 
Non-linear but consistent rule (ie higher 
probability in longer timeframe) 
14 13 
Unity (i.e. same value for both) 14 14 
Inconsistent 9 3 
Total (N) 71 72 
Table 3. Use of scaling between the chance estimates expressed as number of scientists using 
each rule. The reduction in N is due to three scientists not providing estimates for all timescales. 
4.5 Timescale forecasts 
In addition to the questions about likelihood over the three time periods, two further questions 
examined a different use of phrasing:  
 “I believe that [volcano name] will certainly have a major eruption in the next A years” 
(T1) 
 “I believe that there is at least a 50-50 chance of a major eruption at [volcano name] in 
the next B years” (T50) 
Of the scientists who provided responses, 18 gave a number of years for the 50-50 chance that 
was higher than the “certainly” range. Nineteen had scaled up their 50-50 value by doubling it. 
Several scientists (9) gave the same response for each (T1 and T50). 
4.6 Comparing chance and timescale estimates 
In relation to the chance estimates, the distinctions were more marked. Thirty one respondents 
gave low probabilities for the likelihood of eruption in the next 300 years, but then gave much 
shorter timescales over which they were certain an eruption would occur. A further 7 gave a 
higher probability (unity) for the chance estimates and then a longer timescale in response to 
the “certainly” question (Consist_CT1).  
 
Inconsistencies were slightly more marked for the “50-50” variable: thirty two respondents gave 
lower probabilities for chance estimates than for the 50-50 variable (e.g. probability of an 
eruption in 300 years= 1 in 10, but there is a 50-50 chance of an eruption within 20 years; 
Consist_CT50). A further 5 gave higher probabilities. Inconsistencies between chance estimates 
and the 50-50 value (Consist_CT50), and chance estimates and the “certainly” value 
(Consist_CT1), correlated(ρ=0.351, p<0.01). 
4.7 Experts’ confidence 
In total, fifty respondents exhibited either inconsistency between the chance estimates and 
timescale forecasts or inconsistency in their use of frequency notation, or both. Responses to 
the question “how confident are you in the estimates you have provided above” (M=4.44, 
SD=1.22) only predicted one of the inconsistencies – that between the 50-50 value and the 
likelihoods( i.e.CT50; ρ=-0.248, p<0.05). Otherwise, there was no relationship between how 
confident the experts were in their answers and how internally consistent the answers were. 
 
Level of education did not produce any statistically significant results for any of the variables 
considered in this Results section. 
5 DISCUSSION 
The data presented above have a number of limitations. They are of necessity limited to 
volcanoes that are monitored – many volcanoes are not monitored at all, and of those that are, 
there is considerable variation in the methods used. The sample size is relatively small and may 
not be representative of all volcanologists – for example, the survey was only available in 
English, Spanish, French and Italian. The formulation of the questions may necessarily introduce 
some biases, though the results were interpreted with this in mind. However, there are several 
useful results that we draw out in this section. Initially, we discuss how our results might aid the 
framing of questions in risk assessments. We then discuss the implications of the study for 
understanding the cognitive processes involved in probability judgements, and suggest some 
further work that might clarify this. Finally, we assess the broader implications for expert 
judgements about volcanic risk. 
5.1 Framing the questionsThe use of the verbal likelihood scale correlated best with chance 
estimates over medium timescales, and least well over long timescales. The lower likelihood end 
of the scale was associated with greater range in numerical values. Low probabilities have been 
identified as more challenging to work with (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973). In addition, as 
Teigen and Brun (1999) argue, the use of a verbal scale does not necessarily correlate well with 
numerical probabilistic assessments, perhaps because inherent within the wording are 
particular implications. There may also be cultural and geographical variations in what is 
considered a low probability: the scientists represented a wide variety of contexts, but 
discrimination by volcano is not possible in a small dataset. Since volcanic eruptions at many 
volcanoes are low probability high impact events, this result suggests that discussion of 
uncertainties and terminology associated with probability is an important aspect of risk 
assessment.  
  
The fact that the majority of respondents struggled in some way with consistency illustrates that 
phraseology and understanding the type of response required is critical in framing probability 
judgements. Psychological research demonstrates that the framing of questions is very 
important in the interpretation of probabilistic assessments (Gigerenzer, 1991; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1986). In this case, expressing a probability as a “1 in N chance” over a specific time-
period provides lower probabilities than expressing the result as a number of years in which the 
probability reaches certainty or fifty percent. Nevertheless, the use of frequency notation was 
relatively internally consistent: this method of expressing probabilities was generally 
understood. The timescale variables (T variables) were also relatively internally consistent.  It is 
not possible to assess whether or not these values represent consistent underestimation of the 
probability – or whether the timescale variables represent overestimation. Had a single measure 
of probabilistic judgement been used – i.e. either chance estimates or timescale forecasts – 
these differences would not have been apparent. A possible explanation for the differences 
between the likelihood estimates and the timescale values is that scientists were more reluctant 
to give the answer “1 in 1” for the 300 years range, but were more confident when asked for the 
timeframe within which an eruption would certainly occur. It may also be the case that scientists 
found it harder to make estimates based on an externally provided timescale (3, 30 or 300 
years): the fact that nine scientists did not provide these estimates but did provide estimates for 
T1 and T50 might support this. 
 
It is also significant that more scientists were willing to provide timescale values than chance 
values. This suggests that they were more comfortable thinking about the number of years 
within which an event would certainly happen than about providing a chance estimate (“1 in N”) 
over a specified timeframe. Two of these were working on volcanoes that are thought relatively 
unlikely to erupt (values provided for “certainly within” were >100,000) – but the others were all 
working at timescales of 10 to 1000 years for this question. This suggests that some scientists 
generally found it slightly easier to imagine a timeframe than to imagine a chance of “1 in N”.  
5.2 Scaling 
Expert judgement for probabilistic assessments involves the production of individual probability 
distributions for particular potential events (e.g. Aspinall, 2006). In response to the survey, 
experts were asked to produce chance estimates for the likelihood of an eruption in 3, 30 and 
300 years. In most cases, some form of internally consistent scaling was applied. This suggests 
that experts viewed the difference in probability over time as obeying a numerical law – though 
the nature of that law must have varied between experts. Our study could not distinguish 
between using different laws informed by differences in general understanding of volcanic 
processes or by volcano-specific differences (here differences might be defendable on scientific 
grounds). There were no obvious demographic factors.  
 
The use of integers as scaling mechanisms may indicate a level of anchoring in the estimation of 
probabilities: once the probability for the first value has been estimated, the other two values 
follow (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Plous, 1989).  Scientists clearly viewed the logarithmic 
timescale as suggesting some kind of regular relationship with probability. The survey results 
suggest that some scalings were based on log10, others used a linear scale and others a different 
exponent. This suggests that there might be some impact of the anchoring bias in the results. 
Further work, including interviews with scientists about their reasoning, would enable 
investigation of this process. 
 
5.3 Expert probability judgement 
The presence of these inconsistencies and biases suggests that volcanologists vary in their 
approach to probability judgements. We have no data concerning the level of experience that 
our sample of experts had in making such judgements operationally, so there is no information 
about the importance of experience in this paper. However, the psychological literature on 
probability judgement allows some interpretation of the results in terms of volcanological 
expertise and general probabilistic reasoning ability.   
 
This paper has tested the ability – and willingness – of experts in volcanology to make 
probabilistic estimates in an informal context (without explanation of the process or any 
potential substantive outcome from the estimates, such as evacuations). Other studies of formal 
and informal settings have suggested that there is variation between contexts in terms of how 
well calibrated experts may be (e.g. review in O’Hagan et al., 2006), and also that expertise in a 
particular discipline is no guarantee of good calibration (Kahneman et al., 1982; Slovic, 2000) 
Probability estimation is a different cognitive process to volcanological research. It depends on a 
mathematical and philosophical understanding of probability theory, and on an awareness of 
the potential for value judgements to impact reasoning (e.g. Krinitzsky, 1993 – less of an issue, 
perhaps, in this paper, because the values were not being applied in risk assessment). The 
inconsistencies and heuristics revealed in this paper may therefore suggest that probabilistic 
methods in volcanology require a level of training (O’Hagan et al., 2006, make a number of 
constructive suggestions in this regard. See also Kynn, 2008).  
6 CONCLUSIONS 
The data suggest that experts, like laypeople, may be affected by a range of heuristics when 
asked to put probabilities on eruption likelihood over different timescales. Some of these 
produce biases (such as anchoring), while others introduce inconsistency. It is also evident that 
the estimation of lower probabilities is more challenging than estimates of events that are 
perceived as relatively likely.  
We find that: 
 Many scientists anchored their estimates to the initial estimate, and scaled up values 
from there using a range of different scaling factors; 
 Scientists also interpreted timescale variables differently depending on the phraseology 
that was used, producing some inconsistencies in their results; 
 Low probabilities presented particular challenges; 
 Around 20% of scientists were unwilling to make numerical estimates of probability at 
all, due to high uncertainty; 
 Scientists’ confidence in their answers was generally independent of whether or not the 
answers were internally consistent. 
 
These findings are consistent with previous studies (e.g.  Tversky and Kahneman, 1986; 
Lichtenstein et al., 1981; Budescu et al., 2009), and suggest that probability estimation requires 
a level of training and calibration. They also demonstrate that there is high uncertainty both in 
volcano forecasting and in the way that scientists interpret questions, and that some scientists 
might be unwilling to participate in quantitative risk assessment through probability estimation. 
The variation in responses and consistency demonstrates the vulnerability of experts to the 
same inconsistencies as made by members of the public in estimating probabilities, though 
perhaps not to the same degree (e.g. Bolger and Wright, 1994; Slovic et al., 1981; Fischoff et al., 
1982; Rowe and Wright, 2001). The phrasing and framing of probability statements can have a 
significant impact on the results. In volcanology, experts are frequently dealing with very 
uncertain and often low probabilities of high impact events. The data in this paper suggest that 
many of the surveyed scientists are not comfortable with providing numerical assessments of 
likelihood. They may be more comfortable with verbal assessments that the likelihood is 
increasing over background levels, for example – suggested by the unwillingness of some who 
used the qualitative scale to provide quantitative estimates. One approach to this might be the 
use of fuzzy sets (e.g. Dubois et al., 1993; Zadeh, 1982).  
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